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In his 2000 work, Introduction au non-marxisme, François 
Laruelle lays out the principles of his non-philosophical politi-
cal project of establishing 'thought in terms of radical concepts'. 
The concerns of this project are chiefly epistemological; or rather, 
they represent another significant contribution to the development 
of his more general project - that of establishing a 'science of 
humans' (science des hommes)1 which, he argues, should come in 
the stead of philosophy. 2 'Thought in terms of radical concepts' -
which is what non-Marxism in its last instance ought to be - aims 
to radicalise Marxism by ridding it of its transcendental construc-
tions, fixed and unmovable as its unalienable 'essence'. Laruelle 
argues that 'Dialectical Materialism' or 'Historical Materialism' 
is not merely a thesis, hypothesis, axiom, or mere presupposition 
that can be seen as an individual, isolated daim. Rather, it is a 
complex 'cosmology', a transcendental structure that represents 
a system of answers to what are radically rudimentary and fun-
damentally theoretical questions. It forms a complex, inert and 
virtually indisputable (by those who adhere to Marxism) transcen-
dental universe creating a dosed narrative of answers to questions 
which are in fact 'aHected by the immanence' of the Real which 
every Human in the last instance is. The questions Marxism asks 
are phrased in what Laruelle calls radical terms. 3 Nonetheless, the 
proposed answers are products of philosophical autoreferentiality 
representing self-sufficient transcendental edifices. 
AlI theoretical questions in their radical form, i.e., at the 
instance when they hold the status of a 'transcendental minimum', 
done the Real rather than the Transcendental- they are posed by 
the 'Human-in-I-Iuman', not the Philosopher. Such are the ques-
tions that inspire scientific inquiry. Such are the questions posed 
by the Gnostics and the Marxists, explains Laruelle.4 Such are the 
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questions of the Human-in-Human we aIl are in the last instance. 
And such are the questions of the Heretics of Christianity and of 
Marxism. 
Philosophy in the technical sense of the word does not recog-
nise heresy,5 says LarueIle. Still, according to non-philosophy, the 
'World' and 'Philosophy' are synonyms - they are one and the 
same thing. 6 
Philosophy in this sense of the word is scarred by heresy, which 
is inherently present in it, and stained by the wounds of its perse-
cuted heretics. 'The World' could be explained through an analogy 
to, say, Foucault's 'Discourse' or Lacan's 'Symbolic Order' and 
that is why it equals to 'Philosophy' it is the totality of sense 
we assign to the mute immanence of the 'Lived' (or the Real) we 
aIl are. It is not only that alienated and alienating 'Essence' that 
weighs on us, it is also the norm, the normality and the discipline 
the 'World' dictates. Thus it is a 'materialised transcendence', 
it implies living one's life according to a certain Universe-of-
Meaning and it lays the foundations of Right and Wrong - of that 
which the 'World' praises and of that which it punishes. It is the 
Orthodoxy in the total sense and, therefore, it too has its heresies 
and persecuted heretics. 
In Future Christ, first published in French in 2002 and in English 
translation in 2010, LarueIle attributes the capacity of 'immanent 
struggle' to the figure of Christ understood in a way which is, as 
he puts it himself, 'evidently not very "Christian"', in a way which 
is heretical.7 Rebellion (rebéllion)8 or struggle (lutte) is the essence 
of the Subject, maintains Laruelle, and it is so 'because there is a 
Real cause of struggle that is not itself in struggle'.9 That cause is 
the radically insufficient Human-in-Human. Laruelle's Human-
in-Human is the instance of the Real behind the subject and -
quite similarly to the Lacanian concept of the Real - it is passive. 
Therefore, it is fundamentally vulnerable. Thus, it necessitates the 
'Subject' (or the 'Stranger', as termed in Laruelle's Théorie des 
Etrangers first published in 1995) whose function is to struggle 
with and for theWorld. 
LarueIle expressly links the heretical understanding of the 
Christian subject, as one modeIled according to the figure of 
Christ, with the Marxian idea of struggle: in his attempt to explain 
the 'immanence of struggle without goal', 10 he declares he will rely 
on Christianity, Gnosis and Marxism. 11 Here, we shaH seek to 
explore how and why Laruelle chooses to explicate the 'subject of 
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immanent rebellion' precisely by virtue of cornbining Christianity 
and Marxism and according to the procedures of his non-standard 
philosophy. It is precisely these non-standard procedures of 
working with the philosophical or, for that matter, with any tran-
scendental material, which make non-philosophy itself heretical 
- its abandonment of the authority of the Doctrine (any doctrine), 
i.e., of the authority of Philosophy itself. 
The Status of Heresy in Philosophy 
Speaking of philosophy in Future Christ, Laruelle says the fol-
lowing: 'The rnetaphysical forgetting of heresy is its second aspect 
of significance. What is there in the essence of heresy such that it 
still has not penetrated philosophy, never acquired the status of a 
true concept, even a negative or polemical one?'12 'Metaphysical 
forgetting of heresy' refers to the fact that, speaking from the 
standpoint of non-philosophy, heresies do not exist in philoso-
phy - such a possibility is a priori cancelled. As soon as an idea 
emerges as a 'heretical' re-appropriation of a doctrine, of a system 
of thought, it unavoidably becomes the foundation of a new 
philosophical orthodoxy. Such course of development is inevitable 
by virtue of philosophy's intrinsic tendency to create 'cosrnolo-
gies' (universes of meaning), systems (even when they daim to 
be unsystematic or anti-systematic) - its founding principle being 
that of 'auto-reflection,.13 Any 'aberration' in the pursuit of truth 
is susceptible to normalisation. Whatever forms a 'coherent teach-
ing' - a final and endosed universe (a 'cosmology') of meaning 
- offering the sense of controlling the Real by way of reflecting it 
through Thought is part of Philosophy. In other words, whatever 
constitutes a certain orthodoxy is, in fact, philosophy. 
According to Laruelle, by its determination in the last instance, 
Philosophy deals with itself - not the Real. 14 It has duplicated the 
Real into the concept of 'Essence' and 'Being', says Laruelle, and 
its history consists in thinking the endless variations of these two 
products of its own. The history of philosophy is a history of phi-
losophy thinking itself. Concepts usurp the place of the Real - by 
suppressing it entirely - and form endless chains of systemic con-
figurations which pretend to be the reflections of reality. Thus the 
transhistorical philosophical debate has ne ver been about the Real. 
Rather, it has always been a ceaseless, perennial dispute of differ-
ent configurations of the auto-referential Transcendental. François 
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Laruelle argues that even when the 'linguistic' or 'Wittgensteinian' 
turn in philosophy forwards the claim that the Real is inacces-
sible,15 it still has the pretension to re-present the reality, simply 
because it claims there is no reality but the transcendental one we 
cognitively construct. Thus, the constructed reality has claimed 
the status of (the only possible) reality. This is in fact the absolute 
or total completion of the act of philosophy folding into itself and 
over itself (se repliant), i.e., of its duplication or what Meillassoux 
caBs 'correlationism' .16 
The only possible heresy in philosophy would be that of non-
philosophy. Of a stance which is outside philosophy, outside its 
self-content self-circumscription, which operates with its 'tran-
scendental material' in an irreverent way which dismisses any 
authority of philosophy over reality or any superiority whatsoever 
over the scientific (or, for that matter, the poetic). It is a non-
philosophical posture of thought, one which heretically renders 
philosophy to mere chôra (a mess of unorganised 'transcendental 
material') with which it operates when theorising while succumb-
ing to the ultimate authority of the Real. 
The heretical stance is inherently rebellious. The heretic-subject 
is of the immanent struggle. Laruelle claims that there is a 'tran-
scendental universe' issuing from philosophy which is irreverently 
heretical with respect to its origin and founded upon 'radical 
concepts' - the theoretical universe of Marxism. 17 Marxism 
is already in its origin a heretical posture of thought that has 
stepped out of the cycle of philosophy's auto-mirroring. But not 
entirely, according to Laruelle. It is still subject to the essentially 
philosophical constraints imposed by the doctrine of Marxism. 
Orthodox reverence of transcendental constructs such as 'dialecti-
cal materialism' and the inability to reduce them to chôra - mere 
transcendental material instead of finished conceptual wholes - is 
what disables the completion of the project of stepping out of 
philosophy which Marxism initially set for itself (in the Theses on 
Feuerbach). 
In order to radicalise its position, argues Laruelle, and place 
itself outside philosophy, Marxism has to take a step outside itself 
by virtue of admitting its own transcendental, i.e., philosophical 
character. It has to adopt the stance of the 'non-' that is situated 
in the Real that clones itself through concepts. In order to preserve 
its grain of 'thinking affected by immanence', 18 Marxism ought to 
become non-Marxism, argues Laruelle. It is only to Marxism and 
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psychoanalysis that Laruelle ascribes the status of theories that are 
based on 'radical concepts' and have, therefore, accomplished a 
significant although not complete Ausgang from Philosophy. 
The 'real' solution to the problem of the DLI [determination-in-the-
last-instance] as the object and cause of its own theory should avoid 
Hegelian idealism better than it has been done by the materialism. 
Neither a cause in exteriority nor a dialectical identity of contraries, 
the Real is the cause by virtue of immanence and determines cogni-
tion of its own syntax, of its own causality, through a process that 
one would caH 'cloning' ... Suppose there is an object X to be cog-
nised. Provided it is aHected by immanence or susceptible to DLI, that 
is seen-in-One, it also can clone 'itself' from the material that is its 
transcendence. 19 
What remains to be do ne in order to fully realise the act of 
exiting the circular entrapment of the Transcendental (that is, of 
Philosophy) is to adopt the 'Syntax of the Real' in the use of lan-
guage whose most rudimentary elelnent and defining component 
is - the thinking in terms of 'radical concepts'. This position of 
radicalising Thought, bringing it doser to the Real (in the fonn 
of it being 'affected by immanence'), is accomplished through the 
adopting of the heretical posture of thought - a position of imma-
nent, infinite rebellion. To the forms of thought endowed with the 
potential of radical thought - one that is always already attuned 
to the Real - i.e., to psychoanalysis and Marxism, Laruelle adds 
gnosis in so far as it is further radicalised by way of abandoning 
its philosophical constitution and preserving its 'Gnostic essence', 
i.e., the immanent hairesis of the 'Human-in-Human'. 
In order to establish the Inost radical possible stance of heresy, 
i.e., heresy in the last instance, one adopts the immanently rebel-
lious position vis-à-vis 'the World', i.e., vis-à-vis Philosophy. 
Therefore, non-philosophy as a form of heretical situating with 
respect to the discipline of philosophy is further radicalised through 
the adopting of the heretical stance informed by Gnosticism and 
non-Christianity. This positioning of the subject is heretical in the 
last instance - it is the Human-in-Human in its immanently rebel-
lious situatedness as the 'non-Christian Christ' or the 'Messiah' 
(terms which do not refer to the historical or doctrinal Christ but 
rather to the radical idea of it, to the transcendental minimum of 
the notion of 'Christ'). 
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Marxism and Non-Marxism: Cloning the Real into the 
Transcendental Chôra of Marxism 
Laruelle's Introduction au non-marxisme represents an endeavour 
to establish the non-philosophical principles - or rather, the non-
Marxist principles - for Marxian theory and practice in a way 
that will bring forth its 'source of immanence' and 'power (of) 
thought'.20 Non-Marxism is a re-appropriation of Marxism which 
takes place by way of transforming it into a thought of 'the imma-
nent mode' [de la manière immanente],21 which is only possible 
if it is dismantled as a consummate doctrine or a 'cosmology' - a 
transcendental structure which, in spite of its potential for various 
reconfigurations, remains an unchangeable structural minimum. 
The abandonment of the 'cosmological' foreclosure of Thought 
leads to its rendering into conceptual chôra, the chaos of the 
unorganised transcendental material. 22 As the result of Thought's 
succumbing to the authority of the Real, it is affected by the imma-
nence (that the Real is) which produces the cloning of the Real into 
the Transcendental. 
Laruelle argues that in order to arrive at the source of imma-
nence for Marxism, and, in that way, clone the identity-in-the-
fast-instance of Marxian political vision, one has to first evacuate 
not only Dialectics but also Materialism, and undertake afresh 
the elucidation of Marxism's Determination-in-the-Iast-instance 
(or la Détermination-en-dernière-instance, hereafter referred to 
as DLI).23 Both Dialectics and Materialism are circumscribed 
conceptual constructions, closed systems of belief. In other words, 
they are not subjected to radical criticism which might issue in 
complete abandonment of both the dialectical and the material-
ist thesis. This is due to the conviction that if one rids Marxism 
of these two 'cosmologies', what remains is hardly Marxism. 
Laruelle's claim is quite the opposite: radical concepts, among 
which the One which is its 'identity in the last instance', are what 
defines Marxism, not the finished doctrinal compounds. Radical 
concepts are always produced according to the syntax of the Real: 
they are not the result of purely philosophical disputes - although 
they are engaged inside philosophy and its history - but rather, of 
the 'transcendental being affected by immanence'. Radical con-
cepts are products of the encounter of Thought with the (indiffer-
ent) Real which results in Thought 'cloning' ('describing') the Real 
by minimum use of transcendental material. The Transcendental 
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'mimes' the Real. This process is enabled by the Real's status of the 
Lived. The Real the non-philosophy attempts to correlate with is 
never the inaccessible In-Itself - it is, rather, the Lived that has not 
been reduced to concepts, ideas, interpretation according to any 
worldview or philosophy. 
In Théorie des Étrangers, Laruelle elaborates the concept of the 
Lived (le vécu) in terms of the non-philosophical appropriation of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. The Lived is also termed 'le joui' (the 
enjoyed) of the 'jouissance' {enjoyment).24 The latter is always of 
the 'World' whereas the former represents the sheer experience 
(preceding Language) of -let us resort to Lacanian terminology-
the thrust of Tuché (or the Real) into the Automaton (Language), 
i.e., into the 'World' and its instance called the 'Stranger' (the 
alienated Self or the Subject). By an analogy to Lacanian psy-
choanalysis, we can explain the Lived as the trauma caused by an 
intervention of the Real ('le joui' which is the purely experiential 
derivative of 'jouissance' - that which is plainly lived, beyond 
the dichotomy of the corporal and the intellectual). The Lived is 
the product of the plasticity (in Catherine Malabou's sense) of the 
Real. We are resorting to the term 'plasticity' in order to describe 
the capacity of the lived to form a posture which enables the syn-
tactic configuration of the Real which is then cloned into the 
Transcendental. It is in this sense that the radical concept 'clones 
the Real'. It is not the reflection of the Real. The latter continues to 
remain indifferent to Thought's actions and pretensions. In itself, 
the Real remains inaccessible to Thought. One of the central goals 
of Laruelle's non-philosophical project is precisely to rid Thought 
of its pretension to reflect the Real, to rid Philosophy's determina-
tion in the last instance as relative to the Real by way of affirming 
its unilateral correlation with it. 25 
The DLI is the core of the 'radical concept' - it is dictated by and 
necessarily correlates with the source of immanence. The radical 
concept is the immediate transcendental extension of - or it can 
also be synonymous with - the determination-in-the-last-instance 
which necessarily succumbs to the authority of the Real albeit 
generated by the Transcendental. The non-philosophical Real is 
without ontology - 'Being' is an inherently philosophicaI notion 
and non-operative in the context of non-philosophy.26 Laruelle 
warns that it should in no way be understood as 'the-Being'. 
The latter is a purely transcendental product of philosophical 
auto-reflexivity - in its last instance, the concept of 'the-Being' is 
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unaffected by the Real. Its origin is purely philosophical. In the last 
instance, explains Laruelle, it is determined by the Greco-Judean 
history of Thought/Philosophy.27 
The Real is quite sÏInply a number or a 'number' - it is 'the 
One'. However, it is an instance which is beyond the dichotomy 
of Matter and 'Idea', beyond the dichotomy of the Body and 
the Mind. It is also an instance beyond the tradition al philo-
sophical concept of the Number. The One of non-philosophy is 
not a numerical category in the conventional mathematical (or 
philosophical-mathematical) sense of the word, since it remains to 
be the impenetrable In-Itself the Real which evades any preten-
tion of Thought to reflect it (without a remainder). It is the Real 
which is indifferent to Thought, one that can never be reduced to 
a concept. 
It is a grammatical category in sorne way: the Real is that 
'one thing', that 'certain something' we are atternpting to think, 
mediate via Language - render it 'meaningful'. It is also a formaI 
category of the non-philosophical thought which prescribes it as 
the only mode of 'theorising' - theoria en heni28 - that can bring 
about accuracy (that is to say, a thought attuned to the Real). It is 
also endowed with political potential since it represents the basis 
for the creation of radical concepts which correlate with the imrne-
diate Real the 'Human-in-Human' is. 'The Real' is the 'Lived' 
of the 'Human-in-Human'.29 The three terms can function as 
synonyms or as metonymic renditions of the 'One'. According to 
non-analysis (the non-philosophical version of Lacanian psychoa-
nalysis), the Real is the Lived prior to its alienation through repre-
sentation. 30 The Lived shapes the syntax of the non-philosophical 
political stance, of the revolutionary (or immanently rebellious) 
thought and practice of non-Marxism but also of the heretic-sub-
ject of non-Christianity. Laruelle frequently refers to the notion 
of the 'Lived' as indeed the Real that every Human in the last 
instance is. 
Non-Marxism is grounded in its DLI which de scribes the Lived 
and is the product of the non-philosophical vision-in-One. 31 The 
operation which produces it is the aforementioned 'cloning' of 
the Real. The latter is a unilateral gesture which renders the DLI 
essentially non-dualistic or 'unmixed', that is, not constituted by 
the amphiboly of Thought and (the idea of) the Real it produces, 
i.e., of what usurps the position of the Real. 32 The DLI is the 
product of the pure Dyad, a binary whose two cornponents (the 
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Thought and the Real) are viewed in their unilaterality. The split 
between the Real and the Thought is insurmountable - thus the 
Dyad is pure. The Transcendental is defined as that transcending 
trajectory, that gesture of correlating with the Real which is a mere 
vector (the opening of epekeina) which does not make a circular 
turn in an attempt to envelop the Real as Philosophy does. In this 
way, non-philosophy - and, for that Inatter, non-Marxisrn as 
weIl - escapes the philosophical trap of creating the lirnitrophy of 
the Transcendental and the Real which results in a transcendental 
grounded in the constitutive split (between Thought and the Real). 
This is what makes aIl philosophical thinking essentially dualistic. 
The dualism in question is always embedded in a form of unit y 
the two components of the binary inevitably create. The only way 
out of the 'unitary thought' (and its dualistic foundation) is via the 
unilateral stance and the thought of the 'pure dyad' it generates. 33 
50, radically different from the philosophical dyad where 
immanence is duplicated by way of creating its re-presentation 
in the 'transcendental immanence' (by presupposing that a priori 
the Transcendental ought to participate in the immanence), 34 in the 
non-philosophical pure dyad the immanence remains obstinately 
mute. By way of affirming its radically different status (that of 
transcendence as tenaciously irreducible to immanence) Thought 
only strives to describe the immanence rather than 'express' it. 
The 'immanent way' of re-reading Marxism (or its non-Marxist 
re-appropriation) consists in the se arch for the cause-in-the-Iast-
instance of MarxisITl by way of using its transcendental material 
in accordance with a principle of isolating the radical concepts.35 
As the result of such a procedure of demontage of the construc-
tion of Marxian orthodoxy we can see the possible obsoleteness 
of the dichotomy materialism/idealism (and, consequently, the 
constructs of dialectical materialism or historical materialism). It 
will also enable us to identify that which really corresponds with 
the 'Lived' and, thus, to establish a syrnptomatology of the Real 
present in the text. 
If it [non-Marxism] would seem to go back there [to Marxism], it 
would be more to its problems rather than to its texts, and to prob-
lems whose solution implies treating the texts as symptoms, by way 
of suspension of the philosophical authority ... It is impossible, even 
in Freud and in Marx, and even more so within a philosophy, to find 
radical concepts of the Real and the uni-versal- solely the unconscious 
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and the productive forces, desire and labour. As soon as one arrives 
to this discovery, psychoanalysis and Marxism gain one utterly new 
sense - a transformation of their theories into simple material '" 
These sorts of disciplines require more than just a simple theoretical 
transformation - a discovery from in 'non-' that would be the effect 
(of) the Real or its action.36 
According to Laruelle, the most radical concept the Marxist 
corpus of knowledge provides is 'productive forces' or 'labour'. 
It is the result of 'cloning' the Real into the Transcendental since 
it cornes directly from the lived of the exploitation of labour, in a 
form which is not philosophically conditioned, defined and pro-
duced. It is a rudimentary description (of the Lived or the Real) 
generated as a unique conceptualisation which is heedless to the 
possible history of philosophical elaborations of a similar concept. 
The Lived is the joui which can follow from the jouissance but in 
fact 'precedes' it - or rather, it is beyond the historie temporality. 
The Lived, the Real of the Human-in-Human, is (in) the radical 
past. 37 Its 'time is without temporality'. 38 Or as Laruelle says, 
'The immanent or inecstatic pa st is inexistent and inconsistent but 
precisely as capable of determining memory and the present as 
material for the future.,39 
The experience of labour and of exploitation of labour takes 
place always already - it happens prior to and after any form 
of political conceptualisation (which could be any process of 
transcendental transposition including the non-philosophical 
'cloning'). And it is to the lived of the exploited labour force that 
the determination in the last instance of non-Marxism should 
succumb. 
The Source of Ceaseless Rebellion: The Heretic 
Laruelle establishes analogous couplings of Gnosis to Christianity 
and of Marxism to Philosophy claiming that what links Gnosis . 
and Marxism - and, in that respect, what makes them fundamen-
tally different from Christianity and Philosophy - is that they have 
both tried to respond to the question 'what is the real cause of 
hUlTlan struggle'. Not only are their respective determinations in 
the last instance affected by immanence - i.e., they mainly rely on 
radical concepts cloning the Real - but they also succumb to the 
Real of the human struggle (or the immanent rebellion). However, 
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Laruelle insists, they have both also retained much from philo-
sophy remaining entrapped in the circular arguments engendered 
by the 'amphibological' transcendental. 
In spite of the radical grain they are based on, they are still, in 
the last instance, part of philosophy and the 'World'. In order 
to further radicalise their potential - bringing them to the (pure) 
Transcendental which would unilaterally correlate with the Real 
and would be determined by radical concepts - Laruelle proposes 
their transformation into transcendental chôra. The produce of 
this process would be Gnosis transforming into non-Christianity 
and Marxism turned into non-Marxism. Both the subject of non-
Christianity and the subject of non-Marxism are defined by a 
single trait in common - the Heretical Subjectivity and the imma-
nent struggle it executes. 
We are pursuing an initial goal, indeed if we have one other than 
that of the immanence-without-goal of the struggle. It is solving the 
Gnostic problem of rebellion as priority of struggle over war and over 
every other determination of a theological nature. However, this solu-
tion continuously relies on Christianity, gnosis and more distantly on 
Marxism, but refuses the Greek confusion of struggle with the agonis-
tic that still marks rebellion.4o 
Agonism implies dialectics. It implies a philosophical project and 
certain eschatology. The immanent struggle, on the other hand, 
one which defines the Gnostic and/or non-Marxist subject, the 
heretic or the 'future Christ', is one which originates from the Real, 
the struggle of the unlearned with the World and its Authority. 
The heretic-subject is the subject of ceaseless, immanent strug-
gle. What defines it is its continuous rebellion against the World 
(against Philosophy, against the Church and Christianity, against 
aIl fonns of ortho-doxy): 'to struggle in an immanent way with 
the World, this is the theorem of the Future Christ. In the begin-
ning was the struggle, and the struggle was with the World and 
the World did not know it ... That is rebellion, its reasons and 
cause.,41 The rebellion that never ceases is affected by the imma-
nence of the struggle which precedes any political project. It is 
'given without givenness' to the Lived since it is only through 
struggle that it establishes its relation to and within the World. 
The anteriority of struggle to a political project which is possible 
only by virtue of being in and of the World is not defined in terms 
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of temporal succession. It is embedded in a form of 'a-temporal 
temporality', or rather, it dwells in the tempus which is constituted 
by the Lived itself - that of the 'radical past'. 
It makes a clean cut at once with the contents of the pa st and of the 
present as well as with their sufficiency, in the name of a radical pa st 
and that which does not pass in being-in-the-Past. This is the human 
immanence of a time-without-consistency, and it makes a clean break 
from their only sufficiency in the name of the future ... 42 
The radical past of the Real and, therefore, of the immanent 
struggle, is pregnant with the potentiality of the immanent and 
infinite struggle - a struggle to come. Radical future is nesting 
in the radical past of the Human-in-Human - the real cause of 
immanent struggle and of the heretic subjectivity. This is an idea 
which reminds us of Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche's concept of 
the 'eternal return' as the past of the constant becoming. In spite 
of the fact that the Deleuzian-Nietzschean 'radical past' do es 
operate as the Real, the Void, the Hole of negativity carved into 
the World of words, the World of images and sounds, it is still one 
which remains faithful to the Transcendental or to History. This 
is so because, in the last instance, it succumbs to the authority of 
the Transcendental rather than the Real - to the ever Returning 
Narrative of the Eternal Return and of the eschatological vision of 
Humanity at the centre of it, coinciding with the 'fissure in time' 
but only in its aspect of the historie occasion of a 'murder of God 
or the father'.43 
Unlike the epic historicity which defines the 'eternal return' 
and its past ripe with future, the radical past of the Lived or the 
Human-in-Human non-philosophy speaks of is a-historical, or 
rather, it has no 'historie intentionality' - it is not of the World, 
it neither uses its means nor does it have the competence to make 
use of them (the Transcendental of the World) and therefore lacks 
hegemonic conceptualisation which would be essentially historie. 
The Lived (le vécu) of the radical past is that which always 
already - or repetitively - becomes the Subject of the World or 
the Subject of Life. The latter, unlike the Lived, is made of the 
Transcendental-- and this is what constitutes the 'future Christ'.44 
Subjectivity is of and for theWorld and so is that of the future 
Christ, of the non-philosophical Gnostic or of the immanent 
Heretic - it is made of Language. What makes it essentially 
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heretical is that it is affected by immanence, by the Lived, and 
follows the dictate of the Syntax of the Real. 
The Lived is the radically solitary stance of 'human insuffi-
ciency' and prior to the 'intervention of the World' taking place 
via 'subjectivation' - it is an instance of radical vulnerability. The 
Heretic Subject remains to be 'affected by immanence' - by the 
Real or the Lived. It is essentially unprotected, essentially exposed 
- radically vulnerable, in the precariousness which constitutes the 
reality of the human animal facing the spectral structure of sheer 
authority that the World is: "'1 (am) in-Life, therefore 1 am in it 
for-the-World", is the new cogito in which the Future Christ per-
forms, that is to say every man or every Lived thing [Vécu] that 
becomes a subject. '45 The heretic's vulnerable opening toward 
the World exposes the solitary Human-in-Human, immanently 
incessantly suffering because the Lived is sheer suffering (beyond 
the distinction of pleasure and pain). The protection that can be 
provided through the instance of the Subject - by mediation of the 
Stranger (l'Etranger) - is fatally porous since the Heretic Subject 
is affected by the radically vulnerable Lived: 'Because man is 
without-consistency, he is on principle, in contrast to other beings, 
able to be murdered, he is even the Murdered as first term for 
heretical thought and for the struggle that it performs. '46 
Unlike the other animais which can also be killed by theWorld, 
the human animal, the 'Murdered one', as 'the first term of the 
heretic thought', is not only murdered by but also for the W orld. 
The directedness toward the World, this vector or arch (one-way 
trajectory of a pure opening) of exposed vulnerability toward 
the World is what the rebellious subject substantially consists 
of. I-Ience, the radical vulnerability or the possibility of being 
murdered is the origin of the immanently rebellious nature of the 
Heretic Subject or the Future Christ. The Gnostic or the Marxian 
subject is one defined as a subject-in-struggle and if further radi-
calised as heretic in the last instance, it becomes the Future Christ 
the non-philosophy invokes. 'We gain in this way from the most 
innovative practical part of Gnostic rebellion as weIl as from class 
struggle in order to gather with faith as so many simple aspects 
in the figure of Future Christ as subject in-struggle. '47 The imma-
nence of heretical struggle stems from the fact that the Lived is 
radically isolated, solitary and in so far as it is simply the instance 
of the Real indifferent to Thought and its pretension to express or 
reflect it - it is marked by the struggle to 'translate' itself in/to the 
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World, by way of estranging itself from itself through the instance 
of l'Etranger.48 
The opening the Stranger (l'Etranger) constitutes exposes the 
vulnerable Lived to the lived effects caused by the World. The vul-
nerable Lived by which the Heretic Subject is always immanently 
affected generates immanent struggle with the World as the 
determination in the last instance of the Non-Christian and Non-
Marxist Future Christ. The World prescribes the Subject, while the 
Lived rnediated through the Stranger struggles against the inhib-
iting effects of heightened alienation. The World has the imma-
nent tendency ta re-pro duce estrangement, to frame the Lived as 
Philosophy, to introduce the constraints of the Transcendental. 
The Lived is endowed with the tendency of immanence and, 
thus, of opposing and rebelling against the spectral autharity of 
the Transcendental. AlI transcendental systems are necessarily 
authoritarian; the Heretic-subject, the agent of irnmanent struggle 
constitutes the inexhaustible source of unending rebellion against 
the all-encompassing Orthodoxy - the World. 
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